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AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER OF SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN THE U.S. AEROSPACE INDUSTRY _
J.M. Kennedy, T.E. Pinelli, L.F. Hecht and R.O. Barclay
ABSTRACT
The U.S. aerospace industry has a long history of federal support for research related to
its needs. Since the establishment of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)
in 1915, the federal government has provided continuous research support related to flight and
aircraft design. This research has contributed to the international preeminence of the U.S.
aerospace industry. In this paper, we present a sociological analysis of aerospace engineers and
scientists, and how their attitudes and behaviors impact the flow of scientific and technical
information (STI). We use a constructivist framework to explain the spotty dissemination of
federally funded aerospace research. Our research is aimed towards providing federal
policymakers with a clearer understanding of how and when federally funded aerospace research
is used. This understanding will help policymakers design improved information transfer systems
that will aid the competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry.
INTRODUCTION
This paper contains a sociological analysis of the transfer of scientific and technical
information (STI) among engineers and scientists who work in the U.S. aerospace industry. The
purpose of this paper is to describe a sociological framework for analyzing the flow of STI.
Through an understanding of the production and dissemination of aerospace STI, we hope to
provide policymakers with information and data that will improve STI dissemination. If
successful, the results from this research will assist the U.S. aerospace industry in improving its
international competitiveness.
Both basic and applied sociology are used to understand the production, transfer, and use
of STI. The examination of the daily activities of aerospace engineers and scientists provides an
understanding of the meaning and use of STI. This analysis is framed in the constructivist
context based loosely on Latour's Science in Action (1987). As applied sociology, the paper
demonstrates how the understanding of social forces that impact on the daily activities of
aerospace engineers and scientists can be used to understand STI dissemination. Through this
understanding, policymakers can develop more effective systems for the transfer of STI.
1The data collection for this project was funded by a grant NAGW-1682 from the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to Indiana university.
BACKGROUND
This paper is part of a five-year Project whose primary aim is to provide an understanding
of, among other things, the information environment in which U.S. aerospace engineers and
scientists work and the factors that influence their use of STI (Pinelli et al. 1993c). From this
Project, we hope to understand the impact of federal policies on aerospace knowledge diffusion
and to contribute to improvements in the transfer of aerospace research knowledge produced
through federally funded research.
The NASA/DoD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project
The NASA/DoD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project attempts to understand
the uses and flows of information at the individual, organizational, national, and international
levels in the aerospace industry. The Project focuses on the methods used by aerospace engineers
and scientists to gather, evaluate, use, and communicate STI. The research is situated in multiple
disciplines. Its researchers have specialties in sociology, information sciences, technical
communications, and survey research.
The Project has four phases. Phase One examines the production and use of aerospace
information by U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists. Phase Two examines how information
intermediaries (principally librarians and technical information specialists) in the aerospace
industry evaluate and disseminate technical information. Phase Three looks at aerospace
engineering in academic settings, to include students, faculty, and information specialists. Phase
Four examines the international dimensions of aerospace STI. A variety of surveys of aerospace
engineers in western Europe and in Asia were conducted in this Phase (Pinelli et al. 1991a).
Federal Technology Policy and the U.S. Aerospace Industry
The U.S. aerospace industry is a critical component of the national economy. Over the
past 20 years, it has consistently been a net exporting industry (second only to agriculture) and
has contributed significantly to minimizing the balance of payments deficits with other
industrialized nations. The industry is a leader in advanced technologies. Most importantly, the
aerospace industry provides well paid and highly-skilled jobs, the types of jobs most important
for industrial and employment growth. Overall, the success of the aerospace industry is critical
to the health of the U.S. economy.
The aerospace industry differs from other U.S. industries in that it is very dependent on
government policies and programs. The U.S. aerospace industry has been described as a
"sheltered" culture (Derian 1990), as opposed to an "exposed" culture, because the federal
government has played a key role in the innovation and diffusion process. The aerospace
industry has benefited from a variety of federal policies. For example, the federal government
has supported the aerospace industry by providing essential research and development (R&D)
activities needed to develop new civilian aircraft. In addition, the US government is a dominant
purchaser of aircraft, primarily for the Department of Defense (DoD). The major US aircraft
manufacturers produce both military and civilian aircraft. The design and development of defense
aircraft have supported technology transfers and the establishment of production facilities that are
usedto build civilian aircraft. In general,thedesignof civilian aircraft hasbenefitedmorefrom
federalresearchanddevelopmentfor military aircraft thanvice versa.
The federalgovernmenthaslongbeeninvolved in aircraft research.In 1915,Congress
establishedtheNationalAdvisory Committeefor Aeronautics,whosemissionwas "to supervise
anddirect the scientific studyof the problemsof flight, with a view to their practicalsolution"
(Bilstein 1989,p. 4). In 1958,the activities of the NACA weretransferredto a new federal
agency,theNational Aeronauticsand SpaceAdministration(NASA). Partof NASA's mission
was "to plan, direct, and conductaeronauticalactivities; to arrangefor participation by the
scientific community in NASA research;and to provide the widest practical and appropriate
disseminationof information" (cited in Langford 1989,p. 12). NASA sponsorsand conducts
researchcrucial to the aerospaceindustry. Accordingto Mowery (1985),the U.S. commercial
aerospaceindustryis uniquein thatit hasbenefitedfrom researchconductedonairframe,engine,
andproductiontechnologies.Otherfederalagencies,notablythe DoD andthe FederalAviation
Administration,fund anddisseminateresearchusedby the aerospaceindustry.
Soundeconomicand policy objectivesaremet throughgovernment-fundedaerospace
R&D. Langford (1989) notesthat the governmentshouldfund R&D whennegativeeconomic
incentivesto the private sectorresult from the research. This problem occurs in aerospace
becauseresearchcostsassociatedwith the developmentof new technologiesare too expensive
to benefit any one firm. Whenthe federalgovernment(usuallyNASA) conductsresearch,it
providespublic benefitsthat cannotbe allocatedequitablyin the private sector. This research
servesto stimulatethe privatesectorandprovidecost-efficientpublic benefits(Langford 1989,
p. S-3).
In thepastfew years,theaerospaceindustryhassufferedfrom thedecreasedfunding for
defense.Thesecuts,alongwith thedecreasein airline traveltriggeredby aworldwide recession,
havereducedthe demandfor new airplanes.In 1992and 1993,shipmentsfrom U.S. aerospace
companiesdecreasedsixpercentandfive percentrespectively.As aresult,theaerospaceindustry
lostabout160,000jobs from 1989to 1992(U.S.Departmentof Commerce1993). This decline
in the aerospaceindustryhurtsnationalsecurity,reducesthegenerationof new technology,and
increasesthenegativebalanceof paymentsfrom the U.S.
More thanmostother industries, aerospace is truly international. One strategy to reduce
the loss of U.S. jobs is for the U.S. aerospace industry to sell more aircraft to other countries by
competing effectively in the international marketplace. The aerospace industry requires a strong
technology and knowledge base to maintain and improve its international competitiveness (Pinelli
et al. 1992a). In the 1990's, the U.S. aerospace industry remains in a strong position to compete
internationally because of its scientific and technical strengths (Lopez and Vadas 1991), but these
strengths will diminish with the globalization of technology and the increased speed of STI
dissemination.
U.S. aerospace companies also cooperate internationally. They participate in joint
ventures with aerospace manufacturers in other countries because all participating companies
benefitfrom them. Foreignaerospacecompaniesdesireaccessto thetechnologyavailablein the
U.S.aerospaceindustry. TheU.S.aerospaceindustrybenefitsbecausethejoint venturesprovide
accessto marketsin other countries. In manycountries,the purchaseof aircraft is part of a
national economicdevelopmentstrategy,andU.S. aircraft manufacturerswould be shut out if
they did not have cooperativeagreementswith manufacturersin these countries. While
technologytransferfrom the U.S. to othercountriesimprovesthe likelihood for the successof
thesecooperativeventuresfor U.S. aerospacefirms, themigrationof U.S.aerospaceknowledge
andknow-howis of greatconcernin internationalcooperation.In the longrun, it maynegatively
impact the preeminentpositionof theU.S. aerospaceindustry.
TheU.S.aerospaceindustrydiffers from its counterpartsin othercountriesin theamount
and types of governmentassistanceit receives. In Europe, Airbus Industrie (AI) receives
substantialsupport in the form of startuploansfrom the governmentsof Germany,England,
France,andSpain(Office of TechnologyAssessment1991).These governments also ensure that
their national airlines will purchase new AI planes. Startup loans and purchase commitments are
extremely important to aircraft manufacturers because these financial incentives allow producers
to design and develop new aircraft without risking substantial losses. Japan, too, provides
significant startup loans for new aircraft development. These countries see support for their
aerospace industries as a form of industrial and employment policy (Office of Technology
Assessment 1991). The effect of government policies is to create an environment in those
countries where risks are minimized in terms of costs so that risks in terms of new technologies
are more enticing. In effect, government support in these countries serves to increase their
international competitiveness (Tyson 1992).
In the U.S., aerospace companies have traditionally benefited from spin-offs from the
R&D activities conducted by NASA and the DoD. As the defense budget decreases in the U.S.,
DoD-funded research will decrease and will impact on the development of new aerospace
technology. For the U.S. aerospace industry to maintain competitiveness, increased and more
rapid dissemination of federally funded STI to the U.S. aerospace industry will be critical. The
U.S. federal government supports the aircraft industry through support of aerospace R&D, but
unlike direct supports provided by other governments, there is no guarantee that the R&D will
be utilized by U.S. civilian aircraft producers. The NASA/DoD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion
Research Project, of which this paper is a part, is aimed at providing an understanding of the STI
diffusion process.
The Role of STI in Aerospace R&D
Success in the aerospace industry requires that organizations take significant risks during
aircraft development. Ten years may elapse from the time the first plans for a new aircraft are
drawn until the new aircraft is first delivery to an airline. During this time, the aircraft designers
continually test their designs as well as incorporate new information available from external
sources. The complexity and the uncertainty in aircraft development, along with the competitive
nature of the marketplace, produce conflicting demands on aircraft designers. They must balance
the need to incorporate new technology with the possibility that it may have unforeseen conse-
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quences.Increasedaccessto STI canreducethe possibility of error in these decisions and allow
the aircraft to come to market more quickly and efficiently.
Ideally, a designer will have access to all public knowledge related to the aircraft system
that s/he is designing. During the development period, research within and outside the
organization is conducted. We can assume the designers access internal research. Federal
policies support a system in which federally funded aerospace STI is assumed to be adequately
disseminated, but the effectiveness of the dissemination in reaching the appropriate aircraft
designers is not fully determined. In particular, there is little information on how effectively the
results of federally funded aerospace STI diffuse to the U.S. aerospace industry where those who
need the information can use it.
The Federal Aerospace STI System
The federal government attempts to disseminate aerospace STI through a variety of
sources and products. DoD and NASA technical reports that are produced through federally
funded R&D and that are unclassified and publicly available are available through the National
Technical Information Service (NTIS). NASA regularly holds conferences and workshops on
various areas of technology and offers four information products designed to help aerospace
engineers and scientists gain access to the STI needed to perform their professional duties. STAR
(Scientific and Technical Aerospace Reports) is an announcement journal that contains
bibliographic information and abstracts of technical reports produced by NASA and its
contractors. 1AA (International Aerospace Abstracts), published by the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), contains bibliographic information and abstracts of "open
literature" such as conference papers and journal articles in aerospace and related disciplines.
SCAN (Selected Current Aerospace Notices), a current awareness publication containing
bibliographic information and abstracts of technical reports and open literature publications in
aerospace and related disciplines. SCAN is available on the Internet. RECON (REsearch
CONnection) is the NASA online search and retrieval system. NASA uses considerable resources
to make aerospace STI available to the U.S. aerospace community.
Models for Disseminating Federal STI
The federal STI dissemination strategy is based on the assumption that the adequate
documentation, cataloging, and availability of materials provide access to STI. The distribution
system appears to provide sufficient documentation and cataloging of all relevant federally funded
aerospace STI. Yet previous research conducted as part of this Project clearly indicates that the
dissemination system is not fully utilized. The problems of disseminating federally funded R&D
are well known and documented. (See, for example, Averch 1984; Mowery 1983; Tornatzky and
Fleischer 1990.) Three models have been used (Ballard et al. 1989; Williams and Gibson 1990)
to describe the dissemination of federally funded R&D. We can briefly summarize the aerospace
research dissemination problems while describing these models.
The first model, the appropriability model, assumes that competitive market pressures
will promote the search for and use of STI. In this model, the federal government does not need
to create transfer mechanisms but assumes the STI will sell itself. The model ignores the
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problemthat most research is not relevant to most users, so it becomes difficult to determine
which research is most appropriate when users need information to solve technical problems. The
model also assumes the STI transfer channels and sources are identified and understood by users
or that the STI will appear in the open literature, such as professional journals.
The current model in aerospace, the dissemination model, assumes the federal
government must do more than generate STI. Merely producing information will not necessarily
result in its transferring to those who need it. The dissemination model requires that mechanisms
(such as NTIS, SCAN, and RECON) be available to link the STI users (e.g., aerospace industry
engineers) with the producers (e.g., NASA and its contractors). This model is not fully effective
because it is a passive system. Those who need STI must enter the system looking for
information. The model assumes those who look for information have the resources necessary
to find it in a cost-effective manner. Under this model, STI is produced to meet the needs of the
producers, and little concern is given to the users of the information.
Both models assume certain attitudes and behaviors among the users of aerospace R&D
that may not be correct. First, these models might be more appropriate for dissemination to
scientists than to engineers. The models assume that the user will look for new, external
information before or while working on a project, as a scientist will do. Second, these models
do not recognize that users vary in their STI needs. Various factors, such as the type of
engineering being done, influence STI use. For example, research engineers need different types
of information than design or production engineers use. Corporate culture also influences use.
In many companies, in-house materials are expected to meet the STI needs of most engineers.
Third, the models fail to recognize that users are not trained in the use of STI channels and
products. In various parts of this Project, we have examined these factors and found them to be
substantially correct.
A more effective model, the knowledge diffusion model, stresses active intervention and
reliance on interpersonal communications to achieve improved levels of STI transfer. In this
model, the producers and users are linked, and STI products are tailored to the needs of the users.
The dissemination of STI in agriculture and mental health is based on this model, and the model
is closely aligned with TQM-style management procedures. Implementing the knowledge
diffusion model in aerospace would be difficult currently because federal STI dissemination
policies do not support this model. A more active federal role in supporting specific user
information objectives is necessary for the implementation of the knowledge diffusion model.
Despite this problem, the knowledge diffusion model would best serve the policy goals
that provide the justification for federally funded aerospace R&D. That is, the federal
government funds aerospace R&D because the risks are high and the costs of much cutting-edge
research are prohibitive for private sector organizations. However, this model requires a more
thorough understanding of the producers and users of STI than is currently available if adequate
diffusion of the results are to be achieved. An analysis of aerospace engineers and scientists can
help determine why the dissemination model does-not work and what must be understood about
the participants in the STI generation and diffusion process to make the knowledge diffusion
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modelwork. Basicsociologythat analyzesthe daily activitiesandthe social forcesthat impact
onengineersandscientistscanhelpfill this informationvoid. Applied sociologycanhelpdesign
a moreeffectiveSTI diffusion process.
ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS
The constructivist approach to scientific knowledge is used in this paper to analyze the
activities of aerospace engineers and scientists. This approach assumes that scientific (and
technical) knowledge is created, like any other knowledge, through the interactions of
participants. Scientific knowledge is not based on "truth" but rather is created by scientists (and
engineers) to construct understandings and explanations. The microsociological work of Latour
(1987; Latour and Woolgar 1986) is a specific example of this approach. Latour recommends
that to understand science one must "follow the actors." In this Project, we have followed the
actions of the aerospace engineers and scientists as they describe how they use, create, and
communicate technical information.
Latour (1987) used the term "technoscience" to describe both science and engineering.
Success in technoscience results from the recruitment of other scientists (and engineers) into
networks that accept the same explanations of empirical phenomena. Since, to constructivists,
there are no scientific "truths" that exist apart from the interpretations given to them by the actors,
the successful development of a network by recruiting allies is necessary for successful science.
In the same manner, successful technology rests not only on the development of proofs of
concepts but also in recruiting others to believe the interpretation of the explanation of why it
works. For example, Vincenti's (1990) analysis of the Davis wing explains how recruitment can
influence the acceptance and rejection of a new design.
Latour used the term "black box" to describe how the forces used in the recruiting of allies
in science extend to the technical design of an artifact (1987, pp. 128-132) which results in
successful science. He noted that research (basic) is "the first moment, and development is all
the work necessary to make the black box work" (p. 169). The working black box in
technoscience includes the building of a "machine" and the creation of the machine depends on
the successful recruitment of the participants in a technoscience process into believing the
machine is an organized whole of facts and artifacts. The machine represents the "taken for
granted" explanations of how the artifacts function.
Latour argues that engineers and scientists are hard to distinguish from each other in
technoscience. They differ by title, training, and tasks, but when we analyze them as part of
technoscience, they differ only by where they fit into the recruitment process. Other researchers
agree with Latour that engineers and scientists are similar. Citro and Kalton (1989) provide
multiple methods of defining engineers and scientists as a group for statistical purposes, but none
of their definitions fully encompasses both self-identification and actual daily activities.
Numerous researchers have described the differences between engineers and scientists. Pinelli
et al. (1993a, pp. 174-185) review much of this literature. Little of this research provides
empiricaljustification for the differencesascribedto engineersand scientists,but to be fair, the
researchgenerally focusedon other topics. In aerospace,perhapsasin other industries,it is
difficult to classify many of the participantsas either engineersor scientists,despite their
occupationalself-identification.
Examining aerospacerequiresthat we distinguish the professionsof engineersand
scientistsfrom the activities of engineersand scientists. We needto focus on scienceand
technologyastheyactuallyhappen.In aerospace,scienceandengineeringareaimedtowardsthe
innovation and developmentof new technologies. The processof innovationand technology
developmentis basedprimarily on STI and its movement. Scienceand technologymay be
closelyconnectedin someinstances,distantlyin others,dependingon theinformation flows. To
understandthe connections(both strongand weak) in aerospace,we need to examine the
activities of thosewho classify themselvesasengineersandscientists.
Engineersandscientistsbuild machinesthroughtechnicalcommunications.For themost
part, very few aerospaceengineersand scientistsactually build an artifact. They work in
research,design,and development,and they do it using communicationsandcomputers. For
example,theBoeing777wasthe first airplanebuilt withoutanactualmock-upof parts. Rather,
it wasdesignedfully oncomputers.Multiple firms in multiplecountriescontributedto its design
anddevelopmentprimarily throughcommunications.It is throughanunderstandingof the use
of STI and its transfer that we canseehow machinesarebuilt. Successfulmachinesrequire
successfulrecruitment,which in turn is basedon STI dissemination.
In our research,the focusis on thebehaviorsandattitudesof the actors-- engineers and
scientists -- and not on the outcomes -- science and technology. While Latour says they are
connected as part of technoscience, other researchers believe that science and technology are not
as closely related. Shapley and Roy (1985) argue that a progression of ideas from science to
technology does not exist and that there is little communication between them. Allen (1977)
found that there was little interaction between science and technology and that interactions
developed only when the need arose. That is, engineers do engineering until engineering does
not provide a solution to a problem. Only then do they look to science for a solution. While we
have no disagreement with their research, we believe that this disconnect between engineering
and science need not exist and that it is possible to link the two more closely through improved
dissemination of technical communication.
Both engineers and scientists spend a significant portion of their daily activities creating
and using STI. We broadly define STI here to include not only printed materials, such as journal
articles and technical reports, but also other STI products, such as designs and computer
programs. All of these components are needed to create a machine. The traditional distinctions
between engineers and scientists are partly responsible for the shortcomings of the current STI
dissemination system, and by thinking differently we can observe the STI dissemination system
from a different angle. We propose that it is more fruitful to look at engineers and scientists in
terms of their "enrollment" behaviors in technoscience to achieve our goal of developing an
understanding that will allow the design of a better system for diffusing STI.
Let usprovideabrief summary.Engineersandscientistssharesomecommonbehaviors,
but the focusof their work differs significantly. The goalof scientistsis supposedlyto create
"facts";the goalof engineersis supposedlyto create"artifacts." To besuccessful,eachneedsto
find, use,create,and communicateinformation. But the definition of successdiffers for each.
Scientistsdesire the acclaim of peersandrecognitionof priority of discovery(Taylor 1986).
Engineersare more directly involved in organizationsand seek rewards (monetary,better
projects)within the organization. Theorganizationis successfulwhenthe "artifacts" engineers
producesucceedin themarketplace.But bothengineersandscientistsaresimilar in that success
dependson the ability to useSTIeffectivelybothasconsumersandasproducers. "Recruitment"
leadsto successandis accomplishedthroughSTI activities.
The different orientationsleadto different day-to-daybehaviorsin the useof STI, but
eachgroup's behavioris part of the processof technoscience.A significantdifferenceexists
betweenthe purposefor recruitmentactivities of engineersand scientists. From a science
perspective,scientistswant to recruit others, including engineers,into the networksthat they
develop. From anengineeringperspective,engineersneedto recruit others,often scientists,to
justify their designdecisions. The processof recruitment becomesespeciallycritical when
engineersencountersignificantproblemsrelatedto technical complexity and uncertainty. In
aerospace,theenrollmentprocessgoesbothways,andwhenit occurssuccessfully,both groups
benefit.
When we look at the disseminationof aerospaceSTI to seehow well it fits Latour's
descriptionof technoscience,we seethatthecritical connectionsarenot clearandopen. Latour's
modeldoesnot work effectively for two reasons.First, theSTI disseminationchannelsthat are
neededfor recruitment arenot well designedor developed. Second,aerospaceSTI is used
differently thanLatour's modelpredicts.Hebelievesthatrecruitmentgoesfrom sciencethrough
engineeringto makeblack boxeshappen. In fact, recruitmentgoesin both directions, from
scientists(in NASA researchcenters,for example)who needto recruit engineersworking in
industry, and from engineersin industry,who needto useNASA researchto validate their
designs.STI shouldbethecommonlink by whichengineersandscientistsenroll othersinto their
interpretationsof the empirical world. The link is not clearly available in aerospace,and its
unavailability causesproblemsfor both the producersandusersof STI.
METHODS
Multiple surveyswereconductedaspartof this Project. For thispaper,we usedatafrom
a mail surveyof membersof the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
(Pinelli et al. 1991b), a telephone survey (Pinelli et al. 1992b) and a mail survey (Pinelli et al.
1993b) of persons involved in aerospace provided by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE),
and a telephone survey of NASA engineers and scientists working in five NASA research centers
(Glassman and Pinelli 1992). Each group provides a different focus for the use of STI. We
select data from these studies to provide evidence for the assertions made in this paper. Each
group was chosen to represent a different portion of the technoscience continuum. The NASA
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engineersandscientistsat thefive NASA research centers, despite their titles, focus on aerospace
research and might be considered as scientists. The AIAA is a professional society composed
of aerospace researchers. Its membership includes aerospace engineers and scientists who conduct
engineering research. About one-third of its members hold a Ph.D. (Pinelli 1991). Relatively
few design and development engineers belong to the AIAA. The SAE has an aerospace division
that serves primarily design and production engineers. The three groups represent three-fourths
of the aerospace science-engineering spectrum. (The last group - manufacturing and production
engineers in aerospace - were surveyed this summer.)
DATA
We describe our data analysis in a narrative form because the data are taken from multiple
parts of the Project. These data were collected for various specific purposes, generally to answer
a question about the STI dissemination system. As we now look at the various pieces contained
in each survey (and the other surveys conducted in the Project), we start to see the overall system
more clearly.
The STI dissemination process involves many aerospace engineers and scientists in
multiple activities. In the next three sections, we look at some of the activities. First, we
examine the time aerospace engineers and scientists spend in activities related to producing and
using STI. Next, we demonstrate a gap between the design of the STI dissemination system and
its actual use by aerospace engineers and scientists. Finally, we look at differences between the
three groups in their production and use of STI. From these data, we summarize that the
dissemination of STI is not working effectively.
Technical Communications
Following the aerospace engineers and scientists in action requires that we examine their
daily activities. We assert that they spend considerable time using STI in its various forms. In
the SAE mail survey, we asked the respondents to estimate the average number of hours they had
spent each week over the past six months using and producing technical communications. The
respondents reported that they had spent about 18 hours each week communicating technical
information and about 13 hours per week using technical information produced by others. There
were no substantial differences in hours between those who reported research and those who
reported engineering design or production as their primary professional activities. These estimates
agree with those reported in an earlier study of AIAA members (Pinelli et al. 1989). Therefore,
despite the type of science/engineering that characterizes the respondents' work, they reported an
equal number of hours creating and using STI. The respondents may have overestimated the
hours they spend on technical communication, but when they reconstruct their daily lives, they
feel that this activity is the one they do most often. These numbers support our assertion that STI
production and use are the primary activities of both aerospace engineers and scientists.
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Disseminationof NASA STI
NASA providesmultiple formatsfor informingusersandtechnicalinformationspecialists
aboutrecentaerospaceSTI. STAR and RECON are products designed to be used directly by
those who need information, such as engineers in the aerospace industry. Unfortunately, these
products are not used often, especially among design/development engineers. Approximately 40
percent of research engineers and scientists (AIAA members) use STAR and about 22 percent use
RECON. Among design/development engineers, only 19 percent and 8 percent report using STAR
and RECON, respectively.
These products are not used (Pinelli et al. 1994) for a variety of reasons, but the reason
mentioned most often by engineers and scientists is that STAR and RECON are not available or
accessible. The results from our surveys demonstrate one of the principal problems with the
current STI dissemination system. From the federal perspective, these products (STAR and
RECON) are expected to provide quick and easy access to bibliographic information on recently
released STI. But in fact, these products do not fulfill their purpose (demonstrated by the small
proportions of engineers and scientists who use them) and are considered inaccessible by those
for whom the products are intended.
Without this key link between STI producers and users, the dissemination process cannot
function rapidly or effectively. These information products should link STI producers, especially
those whose research is federally funded, to the targeted users -- the engineers in aerospace firms.
The current STI diffusion model in aerospace, which relies primarily on products and secondarily
on intermediaries (technical information specialists) to link the producers and users, is not
working. We think it is not working because the assumptions of the needs and behaviors of the
STI users have not been determined. STI is critical to the recruitment process, and it appears that
in aerospace this process is sporadic and uneven because the links are neither open nor clear.
Production and Use of Aerospace STI
In this section, we compare the attitudes of the three groups towards the production and
use of STI. One survey examined the production and distribution of STI from the perspective
of NASA technical employees at five NASA centers. These employees classify themselves
primarily as engineers (70 percent) and as scientists (23 percent), but they believe that the
production of aerospace STI is an important part of their duties. Over 75 percent of the
respondents to this survey indicated that it was important for them to publish scientific or
technical information. Both from the perspective of the NASA mission and from their attitudes
towards publishing in the open literature, the NASA technical employees we surveyed believe
they are expected to produce STI.
The SAE respondents were primarily design/development engineers working in aerospace
firms. Almost 70 percent agreed with the statement that the primary goal of scientists in
aerospace is to generate and publish new information. Over 95 percent agreed that the primary
goal of engineers is to design or improve a product or a system. Only 35 percent said their jobs
required them to make contributions to aerospace literature. Although they spend substantial
work time dealing with STI, they don't feel that producing open literature is an important part
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of their professional responsibilities. They differ substantiallyfrom the NASA technical
employeesin their orientationto the productionof aerospaceSTI.
Therearealsodifferencesin theuseof informationsourcesamongthegroups. Fromthe
AIAA survey,we haveresponsesto questionson the numberof informationproductsandthe
typesof STI used. Respondentsemployedin governmentagencies(mostly in NASA) hadused
many morejournal articlesthan industryemployeesin the six monthsprior to the survey. In
contrast,industryrespondentsweremorelikely to usein-housetechnicalreports. We foundthat
external STI is more important to the engineersunder conditions of uncertainty. SAE
respondentsreportedthat astheamountof complexityanduncertaintyincreasedin aproject the
more importantthey thoughtit wasto obtainexternalSTI andthe more likely they wereto use
the results from federally funded researchduring their most recent technical project. As
complexity increases, the recruitment process of engineers increases. An effective STI
dissemination system would enhance the recruitment process.
SUMMARY
Much research on STI dissemination activities assumed that engineers and scientists are
similar in their information needs. The similarity lies in the reasons for using STI -- to build
networks and recruit allies in documentation of their constructions of interpretations of the
physical world. Differences exist in the timing and use of STI, differences which appear to be
based on the different ways different groups seek STI. Scientists use STI to start the discovery
process. Engineers use STI as needed to develop a product or process. Scientists need STI to
establish credibility for their arguments. Engineers need STI when their engineering skills, tacit
knowledge, and internal STI do not provide enough information to reduce complexity or
uncertainty in their designs. Engineers prefer internally-generated STI, but the more uncertainty
in a design, the more likely engineers are to look outside the organization.
Latour described the multiple connections between engineering and science in the
development of the diesel engine (1987, pp. 104-132). We expect similar connections based on
knowledge transfers among engineers and scientists in aerospace, but in aerospace these
connections are often weak. These loose connections do not imply that Latour is wrong. Rather,
our data indicate that there may be separate and parallel engineering and science processes in
aerospace that intersect only at very important junctures in aircraft design. Recruitment of allies
for both groups does not often require recruiting from the other group. For the most part, this
system has worked well, as evidenced by U.S. dominance in aerospace.
At the same time, we need to think about paradigm shifts that occur in both aerospace
engineering and science. When they occur, as Constant (1980) pointed out in describing the
turbojet engine, the thinking about design changes quickly. If U.S. aerospace companies are not
tied to information that contains the paradigm shifts, the companies could suffer competitively.
Because of the incredible technical complexity inherent in modern aircraft, paradigm shifts in
various segments of aircraft design (e.g., avionics, acoustics, and engines) need to be constantly
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monitored. Theseparadigmshiftsmaynot beasmomentousastheacceptanceof platetectonics
by geologists(Stewart 1990),but they may be very importantto more cost-effectiveaircraft
design.
The aerospaceindustry is a critically important part of the U.S. economy for both
employmentandexports. Effective diffusion of STI that resultsfrom federally fundedR&D is
critical to the successof the aerospaceindustry. In the current economicand information
environment,important information generatedin technosciencerequiresquick dissemination
beforeits value is lost. Therefore,it is critical that federalpoliciessupportthe creationof STI
diffusion systemsthat facilitate the adoptionof new technologies(paradigmshifts) in the U.S.
aerospaceindustry. In the rapidly changingtechnicalworld, new paradigms,or what Vincenti
(1990) terms "radical designs,"shouldappearmore often. If thesedesignsare diffused and
implementedproperly, they will providea competitiveadvantagefor thosewho use them.
Our researchindicatesthatmorethoughtmustbegivento thesocialcontextof engineers
and scientistswhendesigningan STI system. For example,usingthe work of Giddens(1979,
1984),onecouldexaminethesocialstructuralconditionsthatimpactonengineers'andscientists'
decisionsto useSTI andthe creationof aircraftdesignsthat recreatethe socialstructure. An
analysis of engineering education might further determine how the social structure related to
engineering work is recreated.
The design of an improved aerospace STI dissemination system requires input from
various disciplines. Sociology can be used in an applied setting to assist policymakers in
designing an STI dissemination system that addresses national needs. From our analysis, it
appears that NASA and other federal agencies should move towards the implementation of the
knowledge diffusion model described earlier. If STI producers could be more closely linked to
STI users, more rapid STI transfers could occur. More importantly, better focused STI activities
could be developed, because the needs of those who create the knowledge (engineers and
scientists) could be integrated with the needs of STI users.
McDonnell Douglas estimates that it will cost $1 billion to redesign just the wing for the
airplane that will replace the DC-10 (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993). Two questions arise. First,
has research already been done but not identified that would allow McDonnell Douglas to reduce
its research costs and be more competitive? Second, if such research has been done, is there a
system in place that will provide the information to McDonnell Douglas?
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